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Quill's Call to Action: Will Congress Update
Commerce Clause Nexus Requirements in
Light of Cloud Computing?
by MOLLY SCHNEIDER*

Introduction
The Supreme Court last touched Commerce Clause' limits on
state taxation in an era when products were sold in brick-and-mortar
stores and cell phone use was sixty times less prevalent than it is
today.2 Yet the Court has no plans to modernize the antiquated
methodology that currently limits states' ability to tax interstate
commerce. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court emphasized
that Congress-with its power to regulate interstate commerce-is
the proper branch of government to update and fine tune the rules
that govern state taxation of interstate commerce.! Despite a
constitutional grant of power and an explicit confirmation of
authority from the Court, Congress rarely intervenes in the state sales
and use tax arena.' The only time Congress successfully set a uniform
state sales-and-use tax regime was in 2000 with the Mobile
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; B.A. 2007 University of California at Santa Barbara. I thank Professor Darien
Shanske for sparking the inspiration behind this note and providing wonderful guidance
throughout the writing process. As this is one of the final essays of my academic career, I
must also thank my past teachers for nurturing my love of writing, my parents for their
countless edits over the years, and most importantly, my husband for his unconditional
patience during my three years at Hastings.
1. U.S. CONST. art.I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989); Scott Woolley, Cell Phone Use is
Way Up. So Why Did Brain Cancer Rates Fall?, CNN MONEY (June 7, 2011),

http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/07/cell-phone-use-is-way-up-so-why-are-brain-cancerrates-down/ (cell phone use last measured in 1990, a year after Goldberg v. Sweet was
decided).
3. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,318 (1992).
4. Charles E. McLure Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State
Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals,TAX ANALYSTS STATE TAX NOTES

MAG, Mar. 1, 2004, at 722-23.
[903]
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Telecommunication Sourcing Act ("MTSA"), which provided
sourcing rules for the taxation of cell phones.' Since the enactment of
the MTSA, states are continually attempting to expand their tax
regimes to encompass new technology, but find themselves severely
limited by traditional Commerce Clause boundaries.'
One new industry that states hope to tax is cloud computing.
With the global market for cloud computing posed to increase from
$40.7 billion in 2011 to $241 billion in 2020, it is no wonder that states
are eager to reach this revenue.! But taxing such amorphous products
and services-which can be developed, sold, and used in a
complicated web of locations-raises serious concerns about whether
this new technology can be taxed under traditional Commerce Clause
limitations provided by the Constitution.
This note will discuss whether states need Congress to intervene
or redefine current Commerce Clause limitations in order to tax the
cloud and, if so, whether Congress will act. Part I will introduce the
three main service models of cloud computing. Part II will describe
the traditional constitutional limitations on state taxation and how
these limits constrain states from taxing the cloud. Part III will
discuss whether states can successfully tax the cloud on their own by
analyzing the Amazon tax, where states have individually developed
legislation that requires out-of-state vendors to collect sales tax.
Finally, Part IV will debate whether a uniform approach from
Congress is likely to occur and if it is economically achievable by
comparing the conditions under which the MTSA was passed.
This note argues that congressional intervention is the best
solution to taxing the cloud, yet it is unlikely. In its current state,
technology has outgrown traditional Commerce Clause limits, making
it nearly impossible for states to successfully tax the cloud on their
own. Though congressional intervention would permit states to tax
the cloud, a uniform solution is improbable because it is doubtful that
states and the cloud computing industry will compromise to develop a
uniform solution. Further, such legislation might not completely
alleviate the problems caused by Commerce Clause limitations. The

5. Mobile Telecommunication Sourcing Act, 4 U.S.C. § 116 (2000).
6. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301 (limiting states ability to require out-of-state vendors to
collect sales taxes); Goldberg, 488 U.S.at 261 (requires physical presence in state).
7. Richard Rubin & Juliann Francis, States Pursue Sales Tax Revenue Vanishing
Into Computing Cloud, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com

/news/2011-08-22/states-pursue-sales-tax-revenue-vanishing-into-computing-cloud.html.
8. Id.
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goal of this note is to emphasize Congress' integral role in state
taxation, especially in this age of increasingly rapid technological
innovation.

I. Revolutionizing Products and Services Through the Cloud
Cloud computing has created a new industry where products and
services are stored, delivered, and used by consumers in entirely new
ways. The National Institute for Standards ("NIST") defines cloud
computing as "a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of confirmable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and related with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction."9 Under this dense umbrella definition
there exist three service models that represent the vast array of
industries the cloud touches.o
A. Software as a Service
The most relatable service model is Software as a Service
("SaaS"). With SaaS, vendors sell customers access to programs or
applications that are run on a cloud infrastructure." This means that
the software is housed on a computer server rather than on a
traditional compact disk that is installed onto an individual computer.
This allows the customer to access the software interface from
multiple locations without having to actually load software or
maintain the application through its own IT department.12 Under this
model, the network, servers, storage, and operating system are
managed and controlled by the vendor." Google's Gmail, which
provides an email application over the Internet, is an everyday
example of SaaS." Software companies like Oracle have begun to

9. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUBL'N 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF
CLOUD COMPUTING (2011), available at http://csre.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800145/SP800-145.pdf.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
David Needle, Gmail Success Spells SaaS Superiority, INTERNET NEWS, May 21,

2011, http://www.internetnews.com/software/article.php/3748276/Google+Gmail+Success+
Spells+SaaS+Superiority.htm.
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transition their business model to incorporate SaaS." Oracle sells
software that organizes purchase history and vendor contact
information so that companies can easily keep track of this data."
The software giant has evolved from selling disks to selling access to
an online version of the software." Even though the same software is
being offered, some taxing authorities have treated SaaS software
differently.
Most states impose sales tax on "canned software" or packaged
software that is sold off the shelf but not on software that is
customized for the consumer." These statutes do not, however,
explicitly cover state taxation of SaaS. 9 In 2009, only North Carolina
and Washington had enacted specific provisions for taxing cloudbased software. 20 Some states have altogether ceded their ability to
tax canned software when it is delivered electronically.' Other states,
such as Pennsylvania, have determined that there is no difference
between software delivered electronically or by disk. Where states
have not passed a statute to determine whether SaaS is taxable, the
taxpayer is left in an uncertain position where facts and circumstances
are used to determine whether the software provided online is more
like a service or software.23 This is of great significance because not
all services are sourced to the place of use.24
B. Platform as a Service
Platform as a Service ("PaaS") is similar to SaaS in that the
vendor manages and controls the underlying cloud infrastructure, but,
under this model, the customer actually employs programming
languages and tools provided by the vendor to create or develop

15.

Alex Goldman, Oracle Sourcing Goes SaaS, INTERNET NEWS, Mar. 10, 2000,

http://www.internetnews.com/software/article.php/3809526/Oracle+Sourcing+Goes+SaaS.
htm.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Mark N. Stefan & Mauricio G. Keene, Sales Tax Considerations With Regard to
Bundling in the Cloud, 21 Aug JMTAX 24,28 (2011).
19. Brian Balingit, Taxing Software as a Service (SaaS): Lessons Learned, GRANT
2010,
http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Technology/Tech
THORNTON,
Sept.
dashboard/SaaS_%20article.pdf.
20. Id.
21. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 113.06 (3rd ed. 2011).
22. Id.
23. Balingit, supranote 19.
24. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION

18.05 (3rd ed. 2011).
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applications.25 PaaS replaces the costly and complex development of
building on-premise applications. Salesforce is a prime example of
PaaS. Salesforce provides customers with the infrastructure and userfriendly means to develop applications on Salesforce's network." The
platform allows individuals without extensive formal training to
develop applications on a platform that is well-tested. 7 This provides
an attractive business option to companies that don't have sufficient
capital to invest in the development of their own internal systems.28
Companies like Salesforce are taxed if states deem the services it
provides to be taxable.29 Even if a state has determined that a certain
cloud computing service is taxable, there is still a question of how to
tax the transaction when it crosses state borders. This is a common
problem for companies like Salesforce, whose platform is designed in
California, stored on servers that are potentially in another state, and
often used by a customer in a third state. Some states tax services
based on where the service will be used or enjoyed, while other states
tax services according to where the service was performed." Other
states take a less polarized stance and tax services only in proportion
to the extent they were used within a state." The place of use model
is complicated when multistate corporations have numerous offices
across the country using PaaS. The location of performance is also
problematic, as it is unclear whether performance is the action done
by the servers, which support the enterprise, or the programming that
went into making the servers function as they do. Needless to say,
any legislation that makes PaaS a taxable service must be precise
when defining its sourcing rules.
C. Infrastructure as a Service
Infrastructure as a Service ("IaaS") functions similarly to SaaS
and PaaS in that the vendor controls the underlying cloud
25. Balingit, supranote 19.
26. What is Platform as a Service (PaaS), SALESFORCE. (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.salesforce.com/paas/overview/.
27. Kevin L. Jackson, Platform-as-a-Service:The Game Changer, FORBES (Jan. 25,
2012, 9:03 AM). http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinjackson/2012/01/25/platform-as-aservice-the-game-changer/.
28. Id.
29. See WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 1 12.05, (3rd ed. 2011) ("most
states impose retail sales taxes on all sales of tangible personal property unless explicitly
exempted, but only on specified services"); SALESFORCE, supra note 26.
30.

HELLERSTEIN, supra note 29, at

31.

Id.

1 18.05.
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infrastructure, but it differs in that the customer has the ability to
manage or control the operating system, storage, and deployed
application on the cloud." IaaS simply provides customers with the
necessary storage, hardware, servers, and networking components
needed to function on the cloud." IaaS is attractive for companies
that want to develop and run their own home-built applications or
website but don't want to maintain the hardware to power them,
which can be extremely expensive. 4 Amazon is a leader in IaaS with
its Amazon Web Server, which offers companies the ability to buy
storage for as little as $0.125 for the first terabyte."
Similar to PaaS, IaaS customers will not be taxed unless a statute
specifically defines the services as taxable." This lack of formal
taxation is evident on Amazon's Web Service customer support
website, where it only informs customers about European VAT taxes
but not any U.S. state taxes."
In February 2012, however,
Washington passed a statute that permits the taxation of the service
Amazon Web Service is providing. This is likely the first of many
states that will attempt to tax IaaS.
Much of the confusion involved in taxing the cloud is that states
have not updated their statutes to include the innovative products
that have been developed throughout the past decade. This lack of
legislation is not necessarily a reflection of inefficiency on the part of
state legislatures but rather a possible effect of the stringent
Commerce Clause limitations on state taxation. The following
section lays out these constitutional limitations and considers their
impact on states' ability to tax the cloud.

32.
33.
34.
CLOUD
35.

Id.
Jackson, supra note 27.
Sean Ludwig, Cloud 101: What the heck to laaS, PaaS and SaaS companies do?,
BEAT (Nov. 14, 2011), http://venturebeat.com/2011/11/14/cloud-iaas-paas-saas/.
Mikael Ricknas, Amazon Web Services Lowers Price of Storage in its Cloud,

INFOWORLD (Feb. 07,2012), http://www.infoworld.com/d/cloud-computing/amazon-webservices-lowers-price-of-storage-in-its-cloud-185841.
36. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 29 ("most states impose retail sales taxes on all
sales of tangible personal property unless explicitly exempted, but only on specified
services").
37. AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/tax-help/ (last visited Mar. 05,
2013).
38. John Cook, Amazon Web Services to Collect Sales Tax on Customers in
Washington State, GEEK WIRE (Feb. 16, 2012, 9:04 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2012/
amazon-web-services-collect-sales-tax-customers-washington-state.
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II. Constitutional Limits on State Taxes
The Constitution poses limitations on a state's power to tax
under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process clause. 9 A
majority of concerns in taxing the cloud fall under the Commerce
Clause's nexus and fair apportionment requirements because they are
not easily adapted to reach modern technology. Congress-as a
protector of interstate commerce-is not constrained by the
Commerce Clause, so any action it takes is not controlled by these

concepts.440
A. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process clause provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."" In
the context of state taxation, the Supreme Court has interpreted this
limitation to mean that when a state taxes an entity without having a
"minimum connection" with the entity, the entity has been deprived
of its property without due process of law.42 Courts look for a
''minimum connection" between states and the entities that they tax
to ensure that the "income attributed to the state for tax purposes
[is] rationally related to values connected with the taxing state." 43
In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court recognized that because of
advances in technology and the ability to easily travel across state
lines, physical presence in a state is no longer required to establish a
minimum connection under the Due Process Clause.4 A business
need only purposefully direct their efforts towards the residents of
another state to satisfy Due Process requirements because the
business would have "fair warning that [its] activity may subject it to
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."45
The Due Process Clause does little to limit the states' ability to
tax the cloud because the services or products offered were marketed
for use across the United States. A vendor that sells storage space or
that offers access to their software online around the country would
have minimum contacts with any state where it actively sells its

39.
40.
41.

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,301 (1992).
Id.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

42.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 306.

43.
44.
45.

Id.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977).
Quill, 504 U.S. at 307-08 (quoting Shafer, 433 U.S. at 218).
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products or services. Therefore, states would have little trouble
taxing such goods and services under the Due Process Clause.
B. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to "regulate
Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States."4 6
Where the Due Process Clause concerns itself with the fairness of
taxation of states through notice or fair warning, the Commerce
Clause's nexus requirements are rooted in a concern for the national
economy." In analyzing whether a state has a sufficient nexus, the
Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady set a four part
test to determine whether a state's attempt to tax is permissible: the
tax must be "[1] applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services
provided by the State."4 " Each prong of this test will be considered
independently to determine how it may limit state taxation of the
cloud.
1. SubstantialNexus
The first prong of the Complete Auto test calls for substantial
nexus with the taxing state." Unlike the Due Process Clause, nexus
under the Commerce Clause requires physical presence.o The Court
has not required that the principal place of business be located in the
taxing state, but simply that an entity is carrying on an active business
in the state." Congress has the power to alter the physical presence
requirement.52
The physical presence test is of particular concern with cloud
computing because the cloud is by nature amorphous and flexible
rather than physically sedentary. States have approached the physical
presence requirement from different angles. For SaaS, some states
consider physical presence met in the location where a computer

46.

U.S. Const. art.1, § 8, cl. 3.

47.

Quill,504 U.S. at 312.

48. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
49.
50.

Id.
Id.

51. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1960) (held that independent
contractors working in a state can satisfy the physical presence requirement).
52.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
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accesses the software.' Sourcing a transaction to the location of use
is not precise, however, because the software is not technically
located in a computer but on a server. For this reason, other states
look to the actual location of the servers that store the software." Yet
defining physical presence by servers is also difficult because servers
switch their load throughout the day so that a server in Arizona might
hold the software one hour and a server in Utah might hold it the
next.5 ' Some states have adopted the server model of taxation and
held that nexus requirements were not met where the company
selling the software and the servers on which the software was stored
were outside of the state attempting to collect taxes. 6 A private letter
ruling by the Utah State Tax Commission supported a tax on SaaS
simply because a server in Utah housed the software." The physical
presence of the cloud presents a deep constitutional issue that
appears to severely limit states' ability to tax SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS
because the technology is stored on servers in the cloud rather than in
a single physical location.
2. FairApportionment
The second prong of Complete Auto, fair apportionment, is of
particular interest in taxing the cloud because the technology does not
In
lend itself to be easily sourced to specific jurisdictions.
determining whether a tax is fairly apportioned, the Court in
Goldberg v. Sweet held that it must be internally and externally
consistent." To be internally consistent, the tax must be structured so
that if every state were to impose an identical tax there would be no
duplication of taxes among states." This could be accomplished in
cloud computing if states all taxed businesses on a single criterion that
is limited to a single state, such as a billing address or corporate
headquarters.
53. Michelle Andre, Sales and Use Taxation in the Clouds, KPMG (July 12, 2010),
http://www.kpmginstitutes.com/taxwatch/insights/2010/pdf/wnit-071210-sales-use-taxationin-clouds.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Valerie Sasaki, Cloudy With a Chance of Tax, MILLER NASH (Sept. 02, 2011),
http://www.millernash.com/files/Publication/62e388e8-0bbb-489c-9dfa-ec8fe994253d/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cd9ca38-f775-417c-88d3-33844a70f31e/MillerNash
%20LLP%20-%20NW%20TaxWire%20-%2OFall%2011.pdfl.
56. Andre, supra note 53.
57. Sasaki, supra note 55.
58. 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989).
59. Id.
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External consistency requires that states tax only that portion of
revenues from interstate activity which "reasonably reflects [the] instate component of activity."6' In determining external validity, the
Court does not require that states perfectly apportion tax to the
extent that it relates to the state.6 ' Rather, external validity is not met
where the amount of tax is "out of all appropriate proportions to the
business transacted in that state." 2 The Court has found that a test
that apportions tax based on the company's payroll, property, and
sales in the taxing state is a proper means to measure external
consistency. 3
There is more difficulty in establishing external consistency in
taxing the cloud. For SaaS, it is not immediately clear where a multistate corporation will use the software. Applying the payroll,
employee, and sales volume analysis approved by the Court is
problematical as each variable could point to a different office
location. Colorado has attempted to meet the external consistency
requirement in a tax on SaaS that requires vendors to apportion the
tax in accordance with where the software will be used.
If the
vendor does not know where it will be used, Colorado directs the
vendor to source the transaction to the business address provided by
the customer.5 However, it is not clear if this default rule is a
permissible solution to the problem.6
3.

DiscriminationAgainst Interstate Commerce

The third prong-discrimination against interstate commerce-is
manifested in taxes that inhibit interstate commerce. 7 The concern
here is preventing states from being protective.6 To thwart a State's
protective tendencies, "a state may not tax a transaction or incident
more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely

60. Id. at 262.
61. Hans Rees' Sons v. State of N. Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931).
62.

Id.

63. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 181-84 (1983).
64. Marianne Evans, Cloudy With a Chance of Fog: The Outlook for Cloud
Computing Income Tax Issues, KPMG, (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.kpmginstitutes.com/
taxwatch/insights/2010/pdf/wnit-101110-outlook-cloud-computing-tax-issues.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 581
(1997) (quoting Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992)).
68. Id.
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within the State."69 This issue is not fully relevant in taxing the cloud
because states' aim in this context is to gain a piece of the revenue
generated in this burgeoning new industry rather than to protect local
businesses. Therefore, state taxation of the cloud is not considered
discriminatory because states want to tax inter and intra state cloud
transactions in the same way.
4. FairlyRelated
The final prong of Complete Auto requires that the tax must be
"fairly related to the services provided by the State."o This does not
mean that the tax imposed must be equal to the value of services the
state provided to the activity being taxed." The Court recognizes that
most taxpayers pay more in tax than they receive in benefits from the
state.72 This prong merely requires that the tax charged must be tied
to earnings that the state made possible.73 Upon first glance this
appears similar to the fair apportionment requirement, but this final
prong focuses on the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the
state." A state tax on coal mined by a company was found fairly
related to the taxing state because the company's main activity in the
state was on the coal mining.
Cloud computing will likely meet this final prong because the
two sourcing options-by server or by location of use-are integral
parts of the products and services rendered over the cloud. The
location of where the product is put to use in a trade or business and
the servers, which allow the product or service to be accessed from
anywhere over the cloud, are both integral components of cloud
computing. Thus, any tax paradigm that sources a transaction based
on either criterion will be sufficiently related to the taxing state.

III. Taxing the Cloud Without Congressional Intervention
Due to Congress' bleak history of intervening in state sales and
use tax regimes," states might consider passing legislation to tax the
cloud on their own rather than putting pressure on Congress to act. It
69.

Id.

70.
71.

Complete Auto Transit Inc v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622 (1981).

72.

Id.

73.

Id. at 626.

74.
75.

Id.
Id.

76.

McLure & Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 722-23.
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is unclear, however, if a state-by-state approach would work in taxing
the cloud. The Amazon tax-where states have acted without
Congress-provides insight into the potential benefits and pitfalls that
might come from states' independent taxation of the cloud.
A. Amazon's State-by-State Approach
States cannot require out-of-state retailers to collect sales tax
when the retailer does not have "substantial nexus" with the taxing
state." "A vendor whose only contacts with the taxing state are by
mail or common carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required by the
Commerce Clause." 8 Instead, it is the state's citizens who are
responsible for independently paying the sales tax, but this is rarely
done.' In an effort to capture this uncollected sales tax revenue,
states have started to pass statutes that require out-of-state vendors to
collect sales tax.s This legislation is often called the Amazon tax
because corporate giant Amazon represents many of the online
vendors that would be taxed.
In an attempt to require out-of-state vendors to collect sales tax,
New York passed a statute that requires out-of-state retailers that
produce at least $10,000 in sales to collect taxes from orders placed by
New York customers." To avoid the constitutional issue of nexus, the
statute created a rebuttable presumption that the vendor has a
taxable physical presence in New York, thus requiring such vendors
to collect sales tax.' Amazon has challenged the validity of the
statute, citing Quill in claiming that such a requirement to collect tax
is unconstitutional.83 Amazon's first attempt to squash such taxation
was foiled by the New York Supreme Court, which upheld the
constitutionality of the tax.' California also passed a similar statute.

77.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 301.

78.

Id.

79.

Ian Mount, State's Drive to Collect Taxes on Internet Sales is a Blow to Marketers,

N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/smallbusiness/
drive-to-tax-internet-sales-harms-affiliate-marketers.html.
80. Id.
81. Daniel T. Cowan, New York's Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet: Amazon.com
v. New York State Departmentof Taxation & Finance and the Dormant Commerce Clause,

99 N.C. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (May 2010).
82.

Id.

83. Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation and Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842,
847 (2009).
84. Id. at 851.
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In California's version of the statute, a vendor has nexus when
the company uses "marketing affiliates in the state to refer customers
or if it ha[s] sister companies in California."" Amazon took a
different approach to fight the California legislation. It organized a
referendum against the law so that taxpayers-who see this as a tax
increase rather than another means to collect a tax they already
owe-may vote to decide whether these vendors should collect sales
tax." Amazon later negotiated with the California State Legislature
and agreed to drop the referendum and to start collecting tax at a set
date in the future unless federal legislation is enacted setting another
standard. 7 In addition to collecting sales tax, Amazon has pledged to
create 10,000 full time jobs and 25,000 seasonal employment
opportunities in California by 2015.8 Whether California will be the
norm amongst states is uncertain, especially considering that
California's Silicon Valley is the location where Amazon's lucrative
Kindle is produced." It is likely that Amazon needs California just as
much as much as California needs Amazon to collect sales tax.9
Other states have followed suit, with Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Texas all
passing similar legislation requiring online retailers to collect sales tax
by defining nexus in novel ways so that it might be constitutional.9
Though the initial litigation in New York and negotiations with
California are promising for these new adopters, the question
becomes how effective this state-by-state approach will be in allowing
states to capture additional revenue. As states each pass their own
individual affiliate tax statutes, it is inevitable that final
implementation will be a slow process wrought with litigation and

85.

Marcus Wohlsen, California Governor Jerry Brown Approves 'Amazon Tax

Compromise', HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2011, 8:14 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/09/23/jerry-brown-amazon-tax-compromise n_978287.html.
86.

David Streitfeld, CaliforniaLawmakers Give Amazon Tax Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES

(Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/technology/california-votes-to-giveamazon-a-sales-tax-reprieve.html.
87.

Id.

88. Wohlsen, supranote 85.
89.
90.

Id.
Andrea

Chang,

Despite Strong Kindle Sales, Amazon's Fourth-Quarter

Disappoints, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2012, 1:55PM), http://Ilatimesblogs.latimes.com/
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already increased sales of the regular Kindle by 177%).
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open to further complications of circuit splits, as the different federal
courts might be inclined to come out differently on the issue.
In addition to uncertainty in the law, the state by state reaction
to Amazon has also had a harsh effect on state revenue. Online
vendors have actually moved their online operations from states that
are passing Amazon legislation to states that have not yet
implemented regulations to tax out-of-state vendors. 92 In fact, Rhode
Island and North Carolina have had a reduction in receipts since
passing their respective regulations and it is estimated that California
could lose 25,000 small businesses as a result of passing its own
statute. By separately passing legislation, certain states can become
tax havens that attract businesses from states that chose to legislate.
In resolving the Amazon sales tax issue, the state-by-state
approach has led to multiple chains of litigation, negotiations, and
taxpayers changing their business models to avoid taxation. Further,
with the New York statute being the only piece of legislation to be
litigated on the merits thus far, it is still too early to tell if future
legislation will prove as successful in expanding the current
constitutional constraints on nexus.
B. State-By-State Approach in the Cloud
The most obvious concern with a state-by-state approach in
taxing the cloud is the litigation that will likely ensue to determine
whether states can meet the Commerce Clause's physical presence
requirement. States might receive less pushback on legislation that
taxes the cloud than they did on the Amazon tax because there is no
single cloud computing vendor that represents the industry that can
serve as a vigilant plaintiff. Amazon is a major player in laaS,
however, and this might put them in the perfect position to adopt the
cloud into their battle against nexus expansion.
On the other hand, states are less likely to develop legislation
that taxes the cloud in the first place because they have fewer
incentives to do so. With Amazon, it is clear which taxpayer owes the
tax but it is unsettled who is required to collect the tax. Brick-andmortar stores have put great pressure on legislatures to require online

92.

Dan Mitchell, Will California's 'Amazon tax' cause an affiliate exodus?, CNN

MONEY (June 29, 2011, 9:30 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/29/california-passesamazon-tax-amazon-pulls-plug-on-affiliates/.
93.
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stores to collect taxes. 4 Further, citizens are at least familiar with
paying sales tax. With the cloud, it is unclear to which state the tax is
owed. Additionally, any statute taxing the cloud would not only
create a new tax obligation, but the sole proponents of the tax would
be the state legislatures as many players in the cloud computing
industry do not support such legislation. 5 With only a limited number
of states passing legislation, the state-by-state approach would likely
lead companies to make economic decisions to set up shop in states
that do not tax the cloud, just as businesses have done as a result of
the Amazon tax.
Congressional action would eliminate the complications inherent
in a state-by-state model. It would eradicate the danger of litigation
because nexus requirements would not inhibit Congress' plan to tax
the cloud. Further, a uniformed approach from Congress would
prevent businesses from reorganizing to get preferential tax treatment
as they would be taxed the same regardless of their location.

IV. Congressional Intervention
With a state-by-state approach leading to undesirable
consequences, a Congressional solution to taxing the cloud appears to
provide a better solution. The question becomes whether Congress
will break with tradition and help states tax the cloud, and if it does,
whether this is economically feasible. The MTSA provides great
insight to the conditions that might be required for Congress to act
and the impact of such action.
A. MTSA: A Uniformed Approach

Just as the development of the cloud is grazing the limits of our
tax system, the development of telecommunications technology
challenged the existing conceptions of physical presence starting in
the mid-eighties. Traditionally, telephone calls were placed through
electronic wires, but technology advanced to using electronic paths to
transmit calls through fiber optics, microwave towers, satellites, and
cables.'
This shift strained the existing taxation of

94.

Sylvia Dion, From Main Street to Marketplace Fairness Acts - Sales Tax 2011,

SALES TAX SUPPORT.COM (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.salestaxsupport.com/blogs/salesuse-tax/internet-tax-ecommerce/main-street-to-marketplace-fairness-acts-sales-tax-2011/.
95. Rubin & Francis, supra note 7.

96. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 252 (1989).
97.

Id.
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telecommunications because there were innumerable paths through
which a call could travel making it impossible to trace the call."
The Supreme Court reviewed whether an Illinois tax on calls
placed or terminated within Illinois and charged to an Illinois service
address violated the Commerce Clause." The specific concern was
the second prong of Complete Auto, the fair apportionment of
taxes.'" The Court found that the tax was both internally and
externally consistent because it would not result in double taxation."0 '
This case only involved landline calls and not cell phone calls, so it did
not provide clear guidance on this new technology's impact on
nexus. 1
The eventual widespread use of cell phones allowed
customers to easily move across state lines, thus further blurring the
source of the call. It is clear to anyone that has had the misfortune
of riding on public transit with a person on a cell phone that it is often
possible for a call made in one state to end in another. Many states
resorted to a two-out-of-three method, where the state could tax a
call if it had two of three factors: origin of call, billing address, the
destination of the call.'?
The telecommunication industry and state and local franchise
boards united to iron out the complications and developed uniformed
nexus rules for taxing cell phones.'
In January 2000, Congress
introduced the MTSA, which proposed nexus rules for state taxation
of telecommunications.' 6 The Act was meant to cover any fee paid
by "customers for mobile telecommunications services."', The Act
taxes the call from the source of the caller's primary place of use,
"regardless of where the mobile telecommunications services
Congress passed the
originate, terminate, or pass through."'0
Wireless
legislation, applauding it for being a "win-win-win.""
companies no longer had to keep track of the countless jurisdictions'
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 260.
101. Id.
102. Inna Volfson, A Less Taxing Process, CONNECTED PLANET (Dec. 1, 2000,12:00
PM), http://connectedplanetonline.com/wireless/mag/wireless_essjtaxing process/.
103. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 252.
104. Volfson, supranote 102.
105. H.R. 4391, 106th Cong. (2000).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 146 CONG. REC. S6812-03 (2000).
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individual rules, state and local authorities would no longer have to
endure the administrative nightmare of ensuring compliance, and
consumers would benefit from fewer inaccuracies in their billing."o
The Act authorized states or providers to compile a database
that identifies the appropriate taxing jurisdiction for each street
address so that the wireless companies could easily bill customers
based on their jurisdiction."' If a state did not provide a detailed
database, providers could also classify addresses by their zip code in
order to find the appropriate taxing jurisdiction."' The complexity of
creating the databases was evidenced in the fact that two years after
the bill passed, only thirty-one states had compliance measures passed
into law."' This reflects the unfortunate truth that even the pursuit of
simplicity can result in headache.
Apart from the intricacies of identifying which address is related
to which tax jurisdiction, determining the primary place of use was
also a delicate process because states had different interpretations.
Pennsylvania, for instance, considered the primary place of use to be
the billing address or the primary business address on the account."'
Yet a home or billing address might not represent the actual place of
use. For example, a New Jersey resident who works in Manhattan
will likely make calls in both states, but only one will count as the
primary place of use. In AT&T's service agreement, AT&T asks the
customer to provide an address of primary place of use and if they do
not, then it will designate a primary place of service." Because this is
a Congressional act, the fair apportionment and physical presence
required under the Commerce Clause are not in play so this default
solution is permissible. It is unlikely that states could implement
similar legislation on their own.
Apart from removing Commerce Clause limitations, the uniform
approach has been a successful way to produce revenues for states.

110. Id.
111. H.R. 4391, 106th Cong. (2000).
112. Id.
113. States Aren't Ready for New Mobile Sourcing Rules, BILLING & Oss WORLD
(July 1, 2002), http://www.billingworld.com/articles/2002/07/states-aren-t-ready-for-newmobile-sourcing-rules.aspx.
114. Id.
115.
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CustomerAgreement.
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All states tax the use of cell phones.'16 Further, they do so at high
rates, an average of 11% when the average sales tax sits around 7%."'
With a relatively easy system to plug into, states can tax cell phone
use without the risk of litigation and guaranteed protections. The
most obvious benefit of Congressional intervention in taxing the
cloud is that nexus requirements would no longer be a concern. Yet
constitutional soundness is not the sole consideration in evaluating
whether Congress should act upon Quill's call to take action in
maintaining nexus requirements. Whether Congressional legislation
will provide economically sound solutions and the likelihood that a
uniform approach is viable are also important considerations.
B. Uniformed Approach in the Cloud: Economic Concerns of
Legislation
It is important to determine whether sound legislation can be
developed to resolve the problems posed by cloud computing.
Professors McLure and Hellerstein argue that remedies to tax issues
should be designed to fix the specific type of problem that exists." 8
The first issue posed by the current constitutional limitations on
taxing the cloud is the adverse economic effects it produces for states,
who are losing revenue on certain products that, before advances in
technology, they had been able to tax. The current state of taxation
of the cloud also creates unnecessary complexity that arises when
states have different means to determine what constitutes physical
presence. This becomes an administrative headache, as companies
must keep track of countless state tax policies. Special solutions are
required to fix these two concerns."
McLure and Hellerstein argue that when current laws produce
adverse economic effects, the rules should be modified.'20 They
recognize that adverse economic effects are ameliorated by the
expansion of nexus requirements so that more transactions are
Therefore, an expansion of the traditional
permissibly taxed.'
concept of physical presence, which can only be performed by

116. Dennis Cauchon, City, State Cell Phone Taxes on the Rise, USA TODAY, May 09,
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-08-cellphone-taxesx.htm.
117. Timothy Noah, Cellular Sin Taxes, SLATE, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.slate.com/
articles/business/the customer/2011/02/cellularsin-taxes.html.
118. McLure & Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 724.
119. Id. at 724.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 735.
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Congress, is the best solution to allow states to tax the cloud and tap
into uncollected revenue. Though an expansion of nexus might
extinguish state's economic concerns, the problem of complexity
might inhibit the extent to which Congress can make such expansions.
Where a current tax regime is riddled with complexities, McLure
and Hellerstein proscribe "coordination and simplification." 2 2
Congress could carry out this solution in the cloud by setting a single
definition of physical presence that can be followed by all states. In
setting a uniformed tax policy, it is essential that such legislation does
"not interfere with market choices" so that the sales tax system will
remain economically neutral.'" An economically neutral solution,
however, necessitates that businesses be exempt from sales tax. 24 As
most of the services and products offered through the cloud are used
solely by businesses, following a policy of only taxing consumers
would not be a feasible response to capture cloud computing revenue.
If legislation was passed to tax businesses on their cloud-based
transactions, Congress would need to set thresholds to determine
which vendors are required to collect sales tax. This will ensure that
the businesses are not deterred from participating in interstate
commerce due to the complexity involved in adapting to a new taxing
jurisdiction's rules. 125 This must be done not by the vendors' total
sales, but based upon their sales in each state to ensure that the sales
in a state are sufficient to warrant adhesion to the complex
administrative obligations required by the taxing state. 26 The MTSA
was not limited by a threshold concern because cell phone companies
are large and they offer a service that is used by a majority of the
population of every single state. The cloud computing industry on the
other hand consists of many players,127 big and small, that offer
products and services that are not so pervasive that every vendor
would have a significant reach into every single state. Developing
legislation to tax the cloud will be a much more delicate process than
taxing cell phones because threshold requirements will need to be
carefully selected.
122.
123.

Id. at 724.
Id. at 727.

124.

McLure & Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 727.

125.

Id. at 732.

126.

Id.
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JOURNAL, Oct. 29, 2009, http://cloudcomputing.sys-con.com/node/770174 (cloud
computing industry is too numerous to make a comprehensive list so only various rankings
of companies that utilize the technology are available).
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On a whole, Congressional intervention would alleviate the
adverse economic effects of the Commerce Clause limitations on
states but it would do so by developing legislation that is not
economically neutral and still wrought with complexity in the form of
threshold requirements. Regardless, Congressional intervention is
still preferable to a state-by-state solution, which is not strongly
grounded in the Constitution.
C. Uniformed Approach in the Cloud: Whether Congress Will Act
In addition to the economic effects of congressional intervention,
it is important to assess whether Congress will actually intervene so
that states can swiftly tackle the issue of taxing the cloud. If it is
determined that congressional action is unlikely, states can
immediately pass their own legislation rather than delay in hopes that
Congress might provide a solution.
On the other hand, if
congressional intervention is quite likely, states can dedicate their
efforts to creating a uniform sourcing strategy, similar to the
negotiations states carried out to help develop the MTSA.
An empirical study revealed three key characteristics that were
present in situations where Congress passed legislation in the realm of
state taxation.'" First, the uniform tax personally aided members of
Congress, second, the legislation benefitted a "specific, well-defined
interest group that orchestrates an extensive campaign with limited
opposition," and third, the uniform plans tended to "represent
compromise between states and taxpayers" as part of a larger set of
legislation." Two of the characteristics of successful congressional
intervention were present during the MTSA legislation, but are
missing in the context of cloud computing: a benefit to a well-defined
group with limited opposition and legislation that represents a larger
compromise. Because key components that produced the success of
the MTSA are missing in cloud computing, it is improbable that
Congress will act in this context.
The second criteria of the study-that the legislation represent a
benefit to a well-defined group with limited opposition-was present
under the MTSA but is lacking in cloud computing. The MTSA
directly benefited the telecommunications industry by reducing the
administrative headache the industry had to go through in
determining how to tax its customers among the various jurisdictions'
128. Katheryn Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J.
LEGIs. 171, 172 (1997).
129. Id.
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tax laws.3 Further, the telecommunication industry is fairly compact,
with only thirty-five principal members in the Wireless Association,
CTIA."' The telecommunication industry was able to define a
uniform interest to impress upon Congress due to its compact size
and the uniform services each member provided. Further, the
legislation that the industry hoped to pass was also supported by
taxpayers and the states, thus providing little to no opposition to the
legislation.'
This same factor is not present in cloud computing, however.
The cloud computing industry, which, for the most part, currently is
not taxed on its products and services, will not benefit by legislation
to tax its products and services. Even if legislation had potential to
benefit this industry, it is unlikely that it would uniformly benefit its
members. The cloud computing industry is made up of a vast array of
companies, where instead of a comprehensive list or organized
association, there are various rankings of the best 150 or 90
companies to watch.' Further, as discussed above, there are various
types of products and services that can be provided through the cloud;
potentially making the industry's agenda dislocated. SaaS companies
might have more incentive to bill based on customer location because
their main focus is selling a more traditional product, whereas IaaS
companies that actually manage the servers might be more inclined to
tax transactions based on server location because this is the area of
the business that they can most easily control. If Congress acts, it will
not likely be due to a uniform effort with the cloud computing
industry.
Another
characteristic
common
among
congressional
intervention in state taxation but missing in cloud computing is that
the legislation represents a compromise. The MTSA was considered
a "win-win-win" showing that the taxpayers, the telecommunications
industry, and states all benefited by the implementation of a unified
tax.m This, however, is not the case with the cloud. Similar to the
out-of-state vendors in Amazon, it is unlikely that cloud computing
companies-who traditionally are not taxed-will work with state

130, 146 CONG. REC. S6812-03 (2000).
131. CTIA MEMBERSHIP, http://www.ctia.org/membershipltia-members/ (last visited
Mar. 23,2012).
132. Cong. Rec. S6812-03 (described the legislation as a "win-win-win" among
telecommunication industry, states, and taxpayers).
133. Geelan, supranote 127.
134. 146 CONG. REC. S6812-03.
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governments to develop new taxes that will make their products more
expensive to consumers and add an additional administrative
headache."' In fact, there are instances where tech companies are
doing the opposite and lobbying to prevent states from taxing specific
cloud computing products and services."1 6
It is therefore likely that states will be required to tackle the
taxation of cloud computing on their own as the current state of
affairs is not conducive to congressional intervention.

Conclusion
State taxation is not simply a product of states, but also of
Congress. Despite the dramatic evolution cloud computing has
brought to the traditional notions of physical presence in our
economy, Congress is unlikely to update Quill's definition of
substantial nexus. Congress will not be motivated to act by an
industry that is eager to simplify tax, but rather inhibited to act by an
industry that is currently free of tax. It appears that the best strategy
for states in this current regime is to tax the cloud individually to the
point that the cloud computing industry is wrought with litigation. It
may not be until the complexities and inefficiencies of a state-by-state
tax system plague the cloud computing industry that Congress will be
inspired to intervene.
Congress is the clear solution to this ineffective system due to its
power under Quill to retire or relax the physical presence
requirement of the Commerce Clause. The Court eliminated the
physical presence requirement from Due Process analysis over thirty
years ago after it recognized that technology had made our society
more interconnected."' Congress is long overdue to carry out a
similar analysis to determine whether technology has truly expanded
beyond what states should rightfully tax or whether nexus
requirements should be expanded to incorporate this new technology.
To make this assessment, Congress must set aside the various
industry concerns that have driven its past action,"' and carefully
modernize the constitutional doctrine it was selected to guard.
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